Kentucky Law Survey: Workmen\u27s Compensation by Cassis, Charles S.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 66 | Issue 3 Article 4
1978
Kentucky Law Survey: Workmen's Compensation
Charles S. Cassis
Brown, Todd & Heyburn
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Workers' Compensation Law
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cassis, Charles S. (1978) "Kentucky Law Survey: Workmen's Compensation," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 66 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol66/iss3/4
Workmen's Compensation
By CHARLES S. CASSIS*
INTRODUCTION
The guests at Justice Lukowsky's party left a body behind.
Apache Coal Co. v. Fuller, 1 thought most Kentucky legislators
and lobbyists at the 1976 Extraordinary Session, lay dead in
the Capitol. But the ghost of Apache, smoldering and clanking
and whispering of "lost wages," haunted the opinions of the
Kentucky Supreme Court and the newly created court of ap-
peals in 1977.
This article will examine the process of judicial decision-
making in last year's workmen's compensation cases. 2 The ven-
ture is timely because the Apache affair shows that the General
Assembly is not entirely satisfied with judicial implementation
of the workmen's compensation law. Our courts must fre-
quently resolve difficult coverage questions without adequate
legislative direction or generally accepted theories of the pur-
poses of public protection. However, insistence on principled
decision-making is essential if we are to develop fair, affordable
concepts and goals for workmen's compensation.
I. THE LEGACY OF APACHE
In the 1976 case of Apache Coal Co. v. Fuller,3 the question
was whether Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) § 342.740(1) 4
* Partner in the firm of Brown, Todd & Heyburn, Louisville, Kentucky. B.S. 1960,
J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky. The author thanks C. Christopher Trower and other
associates at Brown, Todd & Heyburn for their assistance in the preparation of this
article.
t 541 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1976). Justice Lukowsky's invitation was explicit: "We
remind those who may be dissatisfied with this result that the entire concept of work-
men's compensation is a creature of statute . . . .Cries for modification should be
addressed to the legislature." Id. at 935.
I I feel confident in departing from the usual survey format only because my
predecessor's comprehensive and trenchant analysis needs little updating. See, e.g.,
Patterson, Kentucky Law Survey-Workmen's Compensation, 65 Ky. L.J. 411 (1976);
Patterson, Kentucky Law Survey-Workmen's Compensation, 64 Ky. L.J. 307 (1975).
Several recent developments are, however, discussed at notes 20, 36, and 63 infra.
541 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1976).
1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 342.740(1)(1977) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides: "The
minimum weekly income benefits for disability shall not be less than 20 percent...
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always entitles a partially disabled employee to the minimum
compensation of 20% of the average weekly wage of the state.
The Supreme Court held that minimum benefits must be paid,
even though the employee there suffered no decrease in em-
ployment prospects or current earnings.' Apache not only
stunned the business community, but was significant enough
to warrant inclusion in the Governor's call for a special legisla-
tive session.6 Within days of the denial of rehearing, the Gen-
eral Assembly gutted Apache by providing that "there shall be
no minimum weekly income benefit for permanent partial dis-
ability."7
In the course of his Apache opinion, Justice Lukowsky
stopped to comment on two statutory provisions not involved
in the case. As part of the statutory definition of disability,
KRS § 342.620(9) provides that "[a] person who has lost
wages by reason of his disability. . . is entitled to compensa-
tion . . . in an amount equal to the wages lost, so long as this
amount does not exceed the applicable maximum compensa-
tion." A sentence later, the disability definition continues: "An
individual entitled to benefits under permanent partial disabil-
ity shall be entitled to either his lost wages due to his injury,
or body functional disability benefits, whichever is greater."
KRS § 342.730(1)(b), the computation section for permanent
partial disability, similarly states that "the individual entitled
to benefits under permanent partial disability shall be entitled
to income benefits based on lost wages or body functional dis-
ability benefits, whichever is greater." However, KRS §
342.730(1)(b) also provides that "[i]n all other cases of perma-
nent partial disability . . .income benefits shall be deter-
mined according to the percentage of disability." Thus the two
sections seem to provide inconsistent methods of measuring
income benefits in cases of permanent partial disability: "lost
wages" and a percentage of the employee's earnings at the time
of the injury.8
and the maximum weekly income benefit shall not exceed 60 percent ...of the
average weekly wage of the state ... .
541 S.W.2d at 935.
* Governor's Proclamation, Ky. HOUSE JOURNAL 1, 2 (1976 Extra. Sess.).
1976 Ky. Acts Extra. Sess. ch. 26, § 1(1)(b) (codified at KRS § 342.730(1)(b)
(1977)) (emphasis added).
In case of total disability, KRS § 342.730(1)(a) provides for recovery of "66 2/3
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Justice Lukowsky noted that "[t]hese statutes rival the
Internal Revenue Code in complexity and contradiction. Their
seeming internal inconsistency and inconsistency with each
other is hypnotic and soporific." 9 Although he described inter-
pretation of these two statutory provisions as an "unpleasant
task," Justice Lukowsky-perhaps intrigued by the prospect of
bringing order to chaos-wrote:
Suffice it to say that disability is defined and paid for on the
loss of earning capacity theory with a provision for entitle-
ment to compensation based on the actual wage loss theory,
whichever provides the higher benefits. . . .It is apparent
that what the legislature has done is adopt two theories for
the computation of benefits and provide that the employee
is entitled to be paid pursuant to the theory which will grant
him the greater return.'"
These observations were dictum; the issue in Apache was
whether KRS § 342.140(1) established a minimum benefit floor
supporting all compensation claims. But by the end of 1977,
Apache's notion of "lost wages" compensation had prevailed in
the court of appeals. If the Supreme Court explicitly approves
the lost wages doctrine, it will cause changes in Kentucky's
workmen's compensation law that will dwarf those threatened
by Apache.
I. "LOST WAGES" IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
The court of appeals first confronted a lost wages claim in
Mills v. Parsley." The claimant was totally disabled, had an
average weekly wage determined pursuant to KRS § 342.140 of
$90, and, since he had two dependents, his income benefit fac-
tor under KRS § 342.730(1)(a) was 60%.12 The rule of C. E.
percent of [the employee's] average weekly wage." This percentage limitation also
conflicts with the language of the definition section, KRS § 342.620(9)(1977).
1 541 S.W.2d at 933. Justice Lukowsky also noted, "A careful examination of these
statutes will quickly establish that a sentence by sentence dissection and attempted
reconciliation would serve only to confound confusion in a field replete with inconsis-
tency." Id. at 934.
, Id. at 934.
No. CA-265-MR (Ky. App. May 20, 1977).
12 At the time the Mills employee was injured, KRS § 342.730(1)(a) provided total
disability benefits of "55 percent of [the employee's] average weekly wage during such
disability, and two and one-half percent of his average weekly wage for each dependent
1978]
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Pennington Co. v. Winburn3 required that his benefits be cal-
culated in the following manner: average weekly wage times
income benefit factor times percentage disability equals bene-
fits payable, reduced-if necessary-to the maximum benefit
payable of 60% of the state average weekly wage as provided
by KRS § 342.740(1).' The claimant in Mills contended that
he was entitled to the maximum benefits of $84 per week be-
cause he had lost all his wages by reason of 100% disability.
The Workmen's Compensation Board denied the lost wages
claim and set benefits under the Pennington rule at $54 per
week. 5
On appeal, the court of appeals embraced the lost wages
theory, and held that the claimant was entitled to maximum
benefits. According to the Mills court, the question involved
only statutory construction. The court found that the provi-
sions of the disability definition section (KRS § 342.620(9)) and
the computation section (KRS § 342.730(1)(a)) were conflict-
ing. The former seemed to allow lost wages compensation while
the latter limited compensation to a percentage of the em-
ployee's average weekly wage. Where two statutes conflict,
Mills said, courts must harmonize them and give effect to both
where possible.'" The court of appeals then concluded:
In applying the above-mentioned guidelines for statute con-
struction, this Court is of the opinion that two separate meth-
ods were intended and provided for by the Legislature and
that the claimant is entitled to receive benefits under the
method providing the greater return, subject to the maxi-
mum set forth in KRS 342.740.'1
One week later, the court of appeals extended the lost
wages concept to permanent partial cases in Bartley & Bartley
Coal Co. v. Ratliff." The claimant's average weekly wage was
up to a maximum of three." See 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 160, § 9(1)(a) (current version at
KRS § 342.730(1) (a) (1977)). The present statute eliminates the calculation for depen-
dents and provides a straightforward benefit of two-thirds of the average weekly wage
of the employee. See KRS § 342.730(1)(a) (1977).
, 537 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1976).
, Id. at 168 n.1.
, No. CA-265-MR (Ky. App. May 20, 1977).
,6 Id. (citing Geheral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Shuey, 47 S.W.2d 968, 970 (Ky.
1932)).
17 Id.
11 No. CA-129-MR (Ky. App. May 27, 1977).
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$200; his income benefit factor was 62.5%; and his percentage
disability was 60%. Under Pennington's construction of KRS
§ 342.730(1)(b), the computation section for permanent partial
disability, the claimant would have been entitled to a weekly
benefit of $75. The court of appeals again disagreed with the
Board's award:
In [Apache] the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that it is
the duty of the Board to compute benefits upon (1) actual
wage loss and (2) weekly benefits under the percentage of
occupational disability formula set forth in Pennington...
and to award the greater of the two as benefits, not exceeding
the maximum. . . .The wage loss of $200.00 per week [due
to 60% disability plus 40% prior active disability] would ex-
ceed the $75.00 per week under Pennington. . .so as to make
the weekly benefits on the wage loss theory $200.00 per week,
reduced to the maximum $84.00 per week. 9
The court of appeals reaffirmed the lost wages concept in
Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Finn."° In that case, the court,
relying primarily on Mills, Bartley & Bartley, and Apache,
" Id., slip op. at 2-3.
No. CA-1087-MR (Ky. App. 1977).
Another significant aspect of Transport Motor Express is that it departed from
apportionment principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Young v. Fulkerson, 463
S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1971). Under Transport Motor Express, the Special Fund is only
responsible for the difference between the maximum benefits and the benefits (before
any reduction to the statutory maximum) that would be payable by the employer in a
case where the Special Fund was not a party. Thus, if an employee has a rather high
average weekly wage, the employer may pay considerably more than its proportionate
share of the disability award vis-a-vis the Special Fund.
Suppose, for example, that an employee injured in 1978 has an average weekly
wage of $300, that he is 80% disabled, and that half of his disability is due to a pre-
existing dormant condition aroused into disabling reality by a work-related injury.
Under KRS § 342.730(1)(b), his benefits are $300 times 66.67% times 80%, or $160.
This exceeds the maximum allowable benefit of $112 per week. Transport Motor
Express requires that the employer's responsibility be satisfied off the top, so that the
employer will be liable for $300 times 66.67% times 40% (half the disability), or $80.
The Special Fund is liable only for the remaining $42 of the maximum benefits. The
employer therefore ends up paying over 70% of the actual benefits received by the
claimant.
This result twists the statutory scheme of apportionment and is directly contrary
to Young v. Fulkerson, 463 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1971), which held that the "employer is
responsible for the portion of the award ascribable alone to the subsequent injury."
Id. at 120. The proper method of determining apportionment should be to determine
the award first, reduce it to the maximum benefits if necessary, and then allocate the
proportionate liability between the employer and the Special Fund according to their
respective responsibilities.
1978]
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reaffirmed that the amount payable to a disabled worker is to
be the greater of (1) lost wages or (2) income benefits under
Pennington, subject in either event to the statutory maximum
set by KRS § 342.740(1).
III. THE IMPACT OF THE LOST WAGES CASES
The lost wages cases balloon the exposure of employers
and insurers. In cases of permanent total disability, the lost
wages doctrine results in the following consequences in 1978:
(1) benefits payable to employees earning less than $112 per
week will be increased by fifty percent; (2) benefits payable to
employees earning from $113 to $140 per week will be increased
from twenty to fifty percent; (3) benefits payable to employees
earning from $141 to $168 will be increased by up to twenty
percent; and (4) benefits payable to employees earning more
than $168 will be unaffected. 21 The doctrine's effect on perma-
nent partial cases resists easy quantification, but here too the
lost wages concept translates into substantially greater liability
for employers and insurers. If the decline in lost wages is
roughly commensurate with the percentage disability, the in-
crease in benefits payable will correspond to the increases for
various wage levels under permanent total disability. If the
percentage decrease in earnings is greater than the percentage
disability, then in many cases benefits may be increased by
more than fifty percent.22
Subject to the maximum benefits provision of KRS §
342.740(1), the lost wages doctrine means that in permanent
total cases, the employee will receive his entire lost income,
rather than two-thirds of his lost income. In permanent partial
2, These computations can be illustrated as follows. Suppose an employee injured
in 1978 earning $100 per week is totally disabled. Under KRS § 342.730(1)(a), his
benefits will be $100 X 66.67% = $66.67. But under the court of appeals' lost wages
doctrine, his benefits will be $100 per week, an increase of 50%. Similarly, an employee
earning $120 per week would be entitled to benefits of $80 per week under KRS §
342.730(1)(a) - $120 X 66.67% = $80. Under the lost wages doctrine, however, he will
receive the maximum benefits of $112 per week, an increase of 40%.
11 These computations can be illustrated as follows. Suppose an employee injured
in 1978 has an average weekly wage of $200 and is 25% disabled by a work-related
accident. Under KRS § 342.730(1)(b) his benefits will be $200 X 66.67% X 25% =
$33.33. But his decline in wages, if equal to his percentage disability, will be $50, or
$200 X 25%. The increase in exposure under the lost wages doctrine is equal to the
difference between $50 and $33.33.
[Vol. 66
1978] KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
cases, the doctrine means that the employee can recoup any
lost income up to the statutory maximum regardless of his
degree of disability as determined by the Workmen's Compen-
sation Board. The crucial point is that in all cases where the
method of computation makes any difference, the lost wages
doctrine will increase the benefits payable to the employee.
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE LOST WAGES CASES
A. Realism
These statistics do not preface a jeremiad about insurance
rates, economic growth, and industry exodus. However, it is
disquieting that none of the lost wages cases mentioned them.
It might be suggested that the financial impact of the work-
men's compensation statute is the business of the legislature
and not the courts. 3 But that contention can claim neither
historical nor doctrinal legitimacy. Kentucky courts have been
fashioning a common law of workmen's compensation for
yearsu--and properly so.2s
However, the lost wages doctrine can trace its origins no
' An illustrative case is Davis v. Comer, 532 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1975), in which the
Court protests that "we did not write this law, and it is neither our responsibility nor
our prerogative to shore it up against the tides of inequity. The legislature opened the
door, and it is up to the legislature to close it if it so desires." Id. at 14.
2" See, e.g., Young v. Fulkerson, 463 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 197*, see note 20 supra for
a discussion of Young; Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968), see notes 55-
64 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of Osborne.
25 The suggestion that a court should not concern itself with whether a literal
application of a statute produces inequitable results would seem to make sense only if
it is assumed that the legislature intended a manifestly inequitable or unreasonable
result. But when there is no evidence of such a legislative purpose, it is ostrich juris-
prudence to recognize inequity and yet adopt a construction of a statute that fails to
correct it. Cf. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 171 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Ky. 1943)
("[wie cannot bury our heads in the sand and say that we do not know that it has
always been the common practice of prudent business men to invest their funds in such
stocks . . ").
Statutory language drafted in response to a broad range of problems may often
encompass situations quite unlike those types of cases which most concern the drafts-
men. However, concern with a major aspect of a problem may lead the legislature to
overlook the combined effect of several different statutory provisions. When an appar-
ently unanticipated application of a statute is in the offing, a court should attempt to
reconcile the interpretation of the statute in marginal situations with the legislative
purpose evidenced by the paradigm cases to which the statute speaks. H. HART & A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1156-57, 1200, 1220-21, 1414-15 (1958).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
further than dictum in Apache. The Workmen's Compensation
Board implemented the doctrine only at the insistence of the
court of appeals. Nothing seems to suggest that the General
Assembly sought to enforce a new and onerous liability when
it amended the statute in 1972.6 In these circumstances atten-
tion to practical policy considerations is mandatory; it blinks
reality to describe the task of deciding the lost wages issue as
"purely one of statutory construction."
B. The Plain Meaning Rule
The decisions in Apache and Mills proceed as if the "plain
meaning" of a statute's literal terms obviated the need for
further analysis. 27 But the literal meaning of a statute is no
more than the meaning that is most linguistically probable.2
The literal terms of a statute do not preclude the possibility
that the General Assembly employed a particular collocation
of words to effect a somewhat different purpose than that
which might be inferred from the definitions of an unabridged
dictionary. 9 Both Apache and Mills accepted the term "lost
wages" at face value, without appropriate attention to the
stiucture of the statute (the definitions section versus the com-
putation section), 0 to the relevance of other statutory provi-
sions (the compatibility of the lost wages doctrine with the
total disability benefits provision of KRS § 342.730(1)(a)), 3' or
to the impact of the doctrine on employers.12 In other decisions,
the Kentucky Supreme Court has tempered the literal force of
2'6 See Part V(A) infra for a discussion of the legislative purpose of the statute.
Apache moved directly from citing the statute to its dictum on lost wages. 541
S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1976). Mills relied only on its own "close reading" of the defini-
tions section. No. CA-265-MR, slip op. at 3.
1 Literal meaning is the meaning carried by language when it is read
in its dictionary sense unaffected by considerations of particular context.
Although literal meaning sometimes coincides with . . .true meaning, as
where language is read out of context or where its meaning is unaffected by
the context in which it is or should be read, more often that context yields a
meaning significantly different from its literal meaning.
R. DICKERsoN, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 38 (1975).
2' See note 25 supra where the importance of the practical application of statutes
is discussed.
" See notes 38,.40 infra and accompanying text for discussion of this distinction.
31 See note 68 infra and accompanying text where this compatability is discussed.
32 See Part Ill supra for a discussion of this impact.
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statutory language in order to avoid unreasonable results. 33
The plain meaning approach to statutory construction
begs the question. In every case the issue is which meaning is
"plain." To say that one possible interpretation is "plain" and
that another possible interpretation is "not plain" obscures the
decision-making process. A court which interprets the terms of
a statute "literally," without inquiring whether that literal
meaning is consistent with the history and purpose of a statute,
may thwart rather than implement the legislature's intent.
C. Stare Decisis
The lost wages cases adhered to the principle of stare
decisis perhaps too readily. Both Bartley & Bartley and
Transport Motor Express, for example, transmuted dictum
" For examples of perceptive and necessary exercises of lawmaking power, see
Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1970) and Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970),
in which the Court left no doubt that the Kentucky common law of divorce as declared
by the Court would govern awards of alimony and restoration of property, rather than
the statutes pertaining to those subjects. Similarly, in Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co.
v. Meek, 171 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1943), the question was whether the enactment of a
statute allowing a trustee to invest in "interest bearing securities" permitted invest-
ment in dividend-paying stocks. The problem was made difficult because the previous
version of the statute had specifically authorized investment in dividend-paying
stocks. Noting that it "would be unreasonable to say that the legislature had any
intention of making such investments unlawful," the Court said:
"The intent of the lawmakers is the soul of the statute and the search for
this intent we have held to be the guiding star of the court. It must prevail
over the literal sense and the precise letter of the language of the statute.'"
So it has always been a recognized power of the courts in the construction of
a statute to delete or interpolate words to prevent an absurd consequence or
to resolve an ambiguity in order to carry into effect the spirit, purpose and
intent of the lawmakers.
Id. at 48 (quoting Bridgeman v. City of Derby, 132 A. 25, 27 (Conn. 1926)).
The United States Supreme Court has been no less flexible. In Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266 (1948), the Court held that although the literal terms of 28 U.S.C. § 394
guarantee all litigants an "otherwise unqualified right" to pro se appellate argument,
that right can "be circumscribed as to prisoners [seeking habeas corpus] where rea-
sonable necessity so dictates." 334 U.S. at 285-86. And in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Court announced the famous "rule of reason" antitrust
analysis and specifically noted that § 1 of the Sherman Act does not embrace "every
contract. . . in restraint of trade . ., but simply imposes the plain duty of applying
its prohibitions to every case within its literal language." 221 U.S. at 63. See 221 U.S.
at 63-70. See also United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44
(1940) ("even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an
unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this
Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words").
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from Apache into a mandate for the lost wages doctrine. 4 But
the fact that a single prior opinion exists should be insufficient
to invoke stare decisis. One rogue opinion may deprive the law
of the accumulated expertise that stare decisis safeguards.
In Transport Motor Express the court sat en banc-the
classic occasion for reevaluation of decisions by separate pan-
els. The majority opinion solidified the lost wages doctrine by
citing Apache and the still-warm panel decisions in Mills and
Bartley & Bartley. 15This rigid application of stare decisis does
not comport with the purpose of the principle of stare decisis:
[S]tare decisis embodies an important social policy. It rep-
resents an element of continuity in the law, and is also rooted
in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations.
But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent
and questionable, when such adherence involves collision
with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrin-
sically sounder, and verified by experience. 6
31 The court in Bartley said under Apache it is the duty of the Board to compute
benefits upon either (1) actual wage loss or (2) weekly benefits under the percentage
of occupational disability formula set forth in Pennington. No. CA-129-MR, slip op.
at 2. Transport Motor Express merely cited Apache without further ado. No. CA-1087-
MR, slip op. at 4.
' No. CA-1087-MR, slip op. at 4. The court of appeals also cited Liberty Engi-
neering & Mfg. Co. v. Granger, 548 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. App. 1977), a case which involved
an employee who had suffered an injury of appreciable proportions but who returned
to work at an increase in pay. Liberty Engineering certainly does not support the lost
wages doctrine developed in Apache, Mills, and Bartley. Indeed, it is fully in accord
with the alternative theory of lost wages advanced later in this article. See Part V and
note 67 infra.
11 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
Difficulty with stare decisis also cropped up in decisions concerning survival of
benefits. KRS § 342.730(4) provides that when an employee entitled to disability
benefits "dies from causes other than the injury before the expiration of the compensa-
ble period specified," his remaining benefits shall be paid to certain survivors. In
Yocom v. Chapman, 542 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1976), the Supreme Court held that this
section permitted a widow, whose husband had been awarded benefits for occupational
disease for 425 weeks, to collect the remainder of his benefits when he died from causes
unrelated to the disease before the 425 weeks were up. This result was entirely correct,
since the 425 weeks was the "compensable period specified." Id. at 511.
In Wagoner v. King, No. 75-988 (Ky. Oct. 15, 1976) (mem. per curiam), however,
the Supreme Court extended survival of benefits to a case in which the employee
suffered a work-related injury and subsequently died from causes unrelated to the
injury. The employee, who was totally disabled, had been awarded benefits pursuant
to KRS § 342.730(1)(a), which sets no time limit on benefits, but provides instead that
benefits will be paid "during such disability." That disability, of course, ended when
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Judge Park's perceptive dissent correctly challenged the court
to explain its prior holdings.1
7
D. Maxims of Construction
The decision in Mills v. Parsley stands as the most defensi-
ble of the lost wages cases. There the court of appeals did not
purport to rely on Apache and could not rely on its own prior
decisions. Confronted with a perceived conflict between KRS
§ 342.620(9) and KRS § 342.730(1)(a), the court declared its
duty to be to "harmonize them and give them such construc-
tion as will give effect to each if possible.
'38
It is not clear that Mills "harmonized" the definitions sec-
tion of the workmen's compensation law with the computation
section. The court of appeals could have reconciled the two
sections by construing the "lost wages" of the definitions sec-
tion to mean a method of determining whether and to what
extent an individual is disabled. "Body functional disability
benefits," as used in the final sentence of KRS § 342.620(9),
would then mean benefits allowable for occupational disability
when an employee's work life is shortened by a compensable
injury that causes no present decrease in wages.
39
This construction of the statute produces "harmony" be-
cause the definitions section would be read as describing the
conditions under which a person may be considered
"disabled," while the computation section is read as prescrib-
the employee died. Yet the Supreme Court awarded benefits to the employee's surviv-
ing spouse, presumably for the remainder of the then-deceased employee's life expect-
ancy.
This result, which would award benefits to the survivors of an employee who died
from an unrelated cause one day after being disabled, was implicitly rejected by the
court of appeals in Silvers v. Marley Company, - S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1978).
There, the court correctly held the rule of Chapman to be inapplicable because in
Chapman "there was a definite period of disability involved while in this case we are
requested to provide a period of disability." - S.W.2d at _. The Silvers decision
was clearly correct because it recognized that the "compensable period" was not a
definite number of weeks, but "during such disability."
31 No. CA-1087-MR, slip op. at 9. (Park, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
No. CA-265-MR, slip op. at 3. (citing General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Shuey, 47 S.W.2d 968, 970 (Ky. 1932)).
' See Couliette v. International Harvester Co., 545 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1976) and'
Liberty Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Granger, 548 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. App. 1977) where
this construction of the statutory language is recognized.
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ing the method of figuring the amount of benefits payable. By
contrast, Mills produced no harmony; it made the two orches-
tras play in different rooms, and gave the employee tickets to
both performances.
One point of view is that maxims of construction "are
useful only as facades, which for an occasional judge may add
lustre to an argument persuasive for other reasons."4 Mills,
however, failed to adduce any reason other than the principle
of statutory harmony for its result, a critical omission consider-
ing the influential role Mills played in subsequent decisions.
Not only did Mills neglect to explore fully the potential of its
chosen maxim, it also ignored at least three other equally appl-
icable maxims of construction that would have led to a differ-
ent result.
One such maxim surfaced in Yocom v. Reid," a compensa-
tion case decided on the authority of "an unbroken line of cases
holding that as a matter of statutory construction, the specific
provisions of a statute take precedence over the general."
2
Mills could have held that the specific provisions of the compu-
tation section should prevail over the general entitlement lan-
guage of the definitions section. A second principle of construc-
tion would also have generated a different result. An agency's
construction of the statute it administers should be respected
by a reviewing court;43 Mills could have accepted the Board's
conclusion that lost wages were not meant as a measure of
compensation. Finally, Mills could have ruled that the compu-
tation section prevailed on the theory that "[w]here there is
an irreconcilable conflict between different parts of the same
act, the last in order of position must control.""
40 NEWMAN & SURREY, LEGISLATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 654 (1955). For a full
demonstration of the fact that for every maxim of construction there is always an
opposite, see Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAm. L. REv. 395, 401-08
(1950).
' No. CA-507-MR (Ky. App. June 17, 1977).
42 Id., slip op. at 5. (citing Kentucky Trust Co. v. Department of Revenue, 421
S.W.2d 854, 856 (Ky. 1967)).
See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
" See, e.g., Gish v. Shaver, 131 S.W. 515, 516 (Ky. 1910).
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE LOST WAGES LANGUAGE
The lost wages cases, swarming with amici curiae are
bound to come buzzing into the Supreme Court next year.
Citing Apache, the claimants will belittle the dispute as a case
of second impression. The insurance companies and employers
will parade the usual horribles that follow increased labor
costs. And the Supreme Court will confront the most difficult
of judicial tasks-the application of a statute in circumstances
apparently not anticipated by the legislature.
A. The Genesis of the Lost Wages Dispute
Prior to the 1972 amendments to the workmen's compen-
sation law, a claim for compensation in the full amount of lost
wages would have been considered frivolous. Prior to 1972,
Kentucky law expressly limited compensation for total, tempo-
rary or partial disability to a percentage of either the em-
ployee's weekly wages or the state's average weekly wage.45 An
argument that the General Assembly meant to offer an em-
ployee the greater of lost wages or percentage benefits must be
predicated on the 1972 amendments, in which the lost wages
language first appeared."
When the General Assembly amended the statute, it prob-
ably had no inkling that its action made lost wages compensa-
tion (as that term is used in Mills) a practical possibility. At
the time, every state paid compensation equal to a percentage
of an employee's former wages, a practice that has remained
unchanged.47 Kentucky itself paid compensation in amounts no
greater than two-thirds of the employee's pre-disability weekly
11 KRS §§ 342.095-.110, reprinted in LEGISLATIvE RESEARCH COMMISSION, KENTUCKY
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW ANNOTATED 44-52 (1970) (repealed 1972 Ky. Acts ch.
78, § 36). KRS § 342.095(2) limited compensation for total disability to "fifty-five
percent of eighty-five percent of the average weekly wage of the state." A ceiling of
"fifty percent of eighty-five percent of the average weekly wage of the state" was placed
on compensation for temporary partial disability under KRS- § 342.100(2). KRS §
342.110(3) provided benefits for permanent partial disability equal to "sixty-six and
two-thirds percent of the average weekly earnings of the employee, subject to the
limitations [of the maximum benefits], multiplied by the percentage of disability."
" 1972 Ky. Acts. ch. 78, §§ 2(9), 14(1)(b) (codified in KRS §§ 342.620(a),
730(1)(b) (1977)).
11 See 4 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 524-29 (1978) app. B,
tables 8 & 9 (showing "maximum percentage of wages" awarded by each state).
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wages." Given this history, it is hardly unfair to conclude that
the Mills version of lost wages compensation is an application
of the statutory language that was never anticipated by the
legislature.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the General
Assembly expended considerable effort in the 1972 amendment
of provisions governing payments for permanent total disabil-
ity, now codified, except for the higher percentage limitation,
as KRS § 342.730(1)(a).49 Yet in a lost wages world, KRS §
342.730(1)(a) is a statutory derelict; a totally disabled em-
ployee will never choose benefits under KRS § 342.730(1)(a)
when he can claim lost wages under Mills.
Moreover, until required by the court of appeals to award
lost wages compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Board
continued to limit benefits to a statutory percentage of former
wages as prescribed by KRS § 342.730(1) (a) and (1)(b).11 If lost
wages compensation were contemplated by the General Assem-
bly, we surely would have had some contemporaneous discus-
sion of the radical departure from prior state policy and na-
tional practice, some legislative reluctance to waste time on a
meaningless total disability benefits section, some objection to
the staggering new liability imposed, or some action by the
Board between 1972 and 1977 signifying its understanding that
the rules had been changed. We had none.
B. Lost Wages as a Multiplier
A statute ought to be presumed to be the work of reasona-
ble men pursuing reasonable purposes." The question thus
immediately presents itself: If the General Assembly in 1972
did not mean to allow compensation in the full amount of lost
wages, what reasonable purpose or policy explains the exist-
ence of the lost wages language in KRS § 342.620(9) and KRS
48 See note 45 supra for computations under the former law.
" Compare 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 78, § 14(1)(a) with KRS § 342.095(1), (2), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 44 (repealed 1972 Ky. Acts ch.
78, § 36). The changes made benefits payable for life (if the disability continued),
rather than limiting them to 425 weeks.
1 See, e.g., Mills v. Parsley, No. CA-265-MR (Ky. App. May 20, 1977); Bartley
& Bartley Coal Co. v. Ratliff, No. CA-129-MR (Ky. App. May 27, 1977); and discusson
in text at note 13 supra.
5, See HART & SACKS, supra note 25, at 1157.
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§ 342.730(1)(b)? The answer is that "lost wages" was meant to
preserve the pre-1972 policy of awarding benefits based on the
greater of (1) percentage disability determined primarily by
comparing pre-injury to post-injury earnings; or (2) in those
cases in which the injury causes no present decrease in wages,
a percentage disability calculated to reflect the reduction in the
employee's future earning capacity traceable to the expected
effects of a current injury. That is, "lost wages" was meant by
the legislature to be no more than a method of determining the
degree of disability.
The 1976 Supreme Court case of Blankenship v. B & B
Coal Co.512 adumbrates this approach to the lost wages language
of the statute. There the claimant sustained an occupational
disability set at 80% by the Workmen's Compensation Board.
The Supreme Court said: "[Blankenship] is to receive his
actual lost wages or his future occupational impairment,
whichever is greater. 5 3 Yet in calculating the claimant's "lost
wages," the Supreme Court did not simply subtract post-injury
earnings from pre-injury earnings and order an award in that
amount. Instead, the Court looked to the difference in earnings
in order to establish the percentage of disability and treated
"lost wages" as merely another factor to be plugged into the
disability benefits formula of KRS § 342.730. 4
Blankenship does not require that lost wages be treated as
a percentage multiplier-any more than Apache requires full
payment of pre-disability earnings. Both cases actually focused
on other issues, and their abbreviated treatment of the lost
wages issue can hardly be regarded as dispositive. Neverthe-
less, Blankenship is important, if only because it shows that
Apache was not the Supreme Court's last or unequivocal pro-
nouncement on the lost wages controversy.
C. Lost Wages Reprise
The presence of the lost wages language in the workmen's
compensation statute is fully explained by reference to the
landmark case of Osborne v. Johnson.5 5 Osborne is no stranger
52 No. 76-644 (Ky. Dec. 3, 1976).
13 Id., slip op. at 2-3.
I d.
432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968).
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to practitioners in the field. Prior to the 1972 amendments,
Osborne was at least as important as the statute in determining
the law of workmen's compensation. This was because Osborne
distilled from a large number of prior cases a comprehensive set
of rules to be followed by the Board and the courts in determin-
ing the level of benefits to be paid an injured worker. It was
from Osborne that the legislature took the lost wages language
that now appears in KRS § 342.620(9) and KRS §
342.730(1)(b).
The Osborne Court began with the proposition that
"disability," as used in the workmen's compensation law,
means occupational disability as distinguished from functional
disability (mere bodily impairment)." Thus, although the
claimant in Osborne suffered a bodily impairment of functional
disability of only 15%, the nature of the disability coupled with
the availability of employment in the local market rendered
him unemployable and therefore eligible for total disability
benefits. This redefined focus on occupational disability led the
Court to the conclusion that "all that need be determined in a
compensation case, as concerns disability, is: To what extent
has the injured workman's earning capacity been impaired?
'5 7
Osborne then established two rules for the determination
of the percentage disability. The Court first considered the case
in which the workman is unable to return to his former job or
to obtain employment at a wage rate equal to that of his former
job:
If the Board finds that the workman is so physically impaired
that he is not capable of performing any kind of work of
regular employment, or if the Board finds that regular em-
ployment in the kind of work the man can perform is not
available on the local labor market, the man will be consid-
ered to be totally disabled. Otherwise he will be considered
to be only partially disabled. And the percentage of his par-
tial disability will be determined by the ratio of the prevailing
56 Id. at 802.
'T Id. at 803. Osborne was also significant in that it led a departure from the rule
that disability would be determined with reference to a workman's usual employment.
After Osborne, disability was determined according to an employee's earning capacity
at any job available in the local market area. See Couliette v. International Harvester
Co., 545 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1976).
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wage rates in the kind of employment available to him, to the
wage rates earnable by him before being injured.5
The Court then approved a second method for determining
the percentage disability in those cases where an employee
suffers a rather substantial injury yet is able to return to his
former job or to work at alternative employment that pays as
well as his former job. It might be argued that, in such a case,
the workman had suffered no disability. However, the Court
noted, "to adopt such a proposition would be to treat earning
capacity as being static and perfectly measurable . . . and to
ignore the attrition from the mere passing of the years."59 In-
stead the Court held:
While a workman who has sustained a permanent bodily in-
jury of appreciable proportions may suffer no reduction of
immediate earning capacity, it is likely that his ultimate
earning capacity will be reduced either by a shortening of his
work life or a reduction of employment opportunities through
a combination of age and physical impairment. Accordingly,
it is our opinion that in those instances in which the workman
has sustained no loss of immediate earning capacity but has
incurred a permanent injury of appreciable proportions, the
Workmen's Compensation Board, under [the permanent
partial disability benefits statute], can and should make an
allowance for some degree of permanent partial disability on
the basis of the probability of future impairment of earning
capacity as indicated by the nature of the injury, the age of
the workman, and other relevant factors.10
When the lost wages language of the 1972 amendments is
read in light of the Osborne decision, the General Assembly's
purpose seems transparent. As used in KRS § 342.620(9) and
KRS § 342.730(1)(b), the term "lost wages" refers to a method
of determining percentage disability by comparing "the ratio
of the prevailing wage rates in the kind of employment avail-
able to [the employee], to the wage rates earnable by him
before being injured."'" But when an employee suffers an ap-
preciable injury without an immediate decrease in earnings, he
5s 432 S.W.2d at 803 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 804.
"Id.
" Id. at 803.
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may be awarded "body functional disability benefits," i.e.,
benefits on account of a physical impairment that decreases
earning capacity "because his injury may reduce his ability to
do some kind of gainful work in the future. 6 2 Both methods of
determining the percentage disability, of course, derive from
the central concept, of occupational disability as opposed to
functional impairment. As explained by the Osborne Court:
The degree of disability depends on impairment of earning
capacity, which in turn is presumptively determined by com-
paring pre-injury earnings with post-injury earning ability;
the presumption may, however, be rebutted by showing that
post-injury earnings do not accurately reflect claimant's true
earning power."
The relationship between lost wages and Osborne was
made clear by the Supreme Court in Volk v. Restaurant Con-
cessionaires, Inc., 5 which has curiously escaped comment in all
the lost wages cases. In Volk, the claimant had been awarded
benefits by the Board based on a finding of 10% permanent
partial disability. The claimant contended that she was enti-
tled to benefits in the full amount of lost wages, but the Su-
preme Court rejected the contention in no uncertain terms:
Mrs. Volk's counsel argues that since, during the 10-week
period Mrs. Volk worked after the accident, she earned 21.4
percent less in wages and tips than she earned in a compara-
ble period before the accident, a reduction of at least that
percentage in her "earning capacity," within the meaning of
Osborne v. Johnson. . . ,has been conclusively established,
and that since she subsequently has earned nothing at all she
has established a complete loss of her earning capacity. The
argument is not valid, because it rests on the erroneous prem-
ise that actual loss of earnings is the equivalent of loss of
42 Couliette v. International Harvester Co., 545 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Ky. 1976).
"The concept of occupational disability was itself expanded in Haycraft v. Cor-
hart Refractories Co., 544 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1976). There, the Court held that the
definition of "injury" in KRS 342.620(1) includes the situation where "the nature and
duration of the work probably aggravated a degenerative disc condition to the degree
that it culminated in an active physical impairment sooner than would have been the
case had the work been less strenuous," even though the condition was neither precipi-
tated nor aroused by any specific work-related incident. Id. at 225-28.
,1 432 S.W.2d at 802 (quoting 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKME-N'S COMPENSATION
§ 57.00 (1976)) (emphasis added).
15 476 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1972).
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earning capacity .... An actual loss of wages may be evi-
dence on the question of what would be the earning capacity
of a person who has the physical disability claimed by the
worker in question, but it is not proof that such physical
disability does in fact exist.6
D. Statutory Mysteries
The theory of lost wages just advanced 7 solves a number
of statutory mysteries that confound the Mills lost wages doc-
trine. The first problem appeared in Mills itself. In that case,
the claimant was totally disabled. The difficulty with a lost
wages award when the claimant is totally disabled is that,
while the permanent partial benefits provision of KRS §
342.730(1)(b) mentions lost wages, the immediately preceding
subsection-which governs benefits for total disability-
contains no reference to lost wages. Any entitlement to lost
wages compensation in a total disability case must be derived
from the definitions section. But the simultaneous absence
and presence of lost wages language in the first two subsec-
tions of KRS § 342.730(1) amount to rather strong evidence
that the legislature did not intend to pay lost wages benefits
-whatever they are-in cases of total disability. And it
proves too much to contend that the definitions section makes
mention of lost wages in KRS § 342.730(1)(a) unnecessary.
If that were so, the General Assembly's use of the term in
KRS § 342.730(1)(b) was redundant.
The alternative view of lost wages advanced here creates
no such anomaly. If lost wages is read to be a method of deter-
mining the degree of disability, then it would not have been
useless for the General Assembly to employ the term in KRS §
342.730(1)(b) while omitting it from KRS § 342.730(1)(a). The
" Id. at 196-97.
17 This reading of the statute's lost wages language is supported by the court of
appeals' decision last year in Liberty Engineering & Mfg Co. v. Granger, 548 S.W.2d
845 (Ky. App. 1977), when the court noted that "[u]nder Osborne v. Johnson ...
loss of earnings was established as the measure of occupational disability." Id. at 846.
It is also implicitly adopted in C. E. Pennington Co. v. Winburn, 537 S.W.2d 167 (Ky.
1976). There, the claimant's pre-injury earnings were $314 per week; his post injury
earnings were $160 per week. Under the Mills lost wages theory, he should have been
entitled to the then maximum benefits of $81 per week. But the Supreme Court
approved benefits of $39.25 per week by using the percentage method of the computa-
tions section.
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reason is that a totally disabled person, as defined by the
Osborne decision, is one "so physically impaired that he is not
capable of performing any kind of work" or one whose disabili-
ties are such that "the kind of work the man can perform is not
available on the local labor market.""5 In such a case, of course,
he will have lost 100% of his wages, and there is no need to
compare the ratio of pre-injury to post-injury earnings to deter-
mine the degree of disability.
In a permanent partial case, however, it is necessary to
compare earnings to determine the degree of disability when
there is a current decrease in take-home pay. And if there is
no current decrease, then the alternative of computing benefits
based on the lifetime earning capacity of an individual who has
suffered an injury "of appreciable proportions" becomes appro-
priate. But in either total or partial disability cases, the lost
wages ratio only determines the degree of disability; the
amount of benefits is determined according to the percentage
formulae of the computations section.
The second difficulty that plagues the current lost wages
doctrine is its inconsistency with the statutory policy of reha-
bilitation. 9 Although Kentucky formerly made participation in
rehabilitation programs voluntary and rewarded participation
as an incentive,'7 the state now requires participation and pe-
nalizes non-participation by slashing benefits of the recalci-
trant employee by 50%.71
The message from the General Assembly is clear. An em-
ployee is to be rehabilitated if possible, whether he likes it or
not, rather than given the option of continuing to receive bene-
fits. The Mills lost wages doctrine, however, undercuts this
policy of rehabilitation. Because compensation benefits are
nontaxable, 2 an employee is better off collecting his lost wages
than he is returning to his former job if his wages would be
below the maximum compensation allowed under KRS §
342.740(1). The lost wages doctrine undermines this work ethic
" Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Ky. 1968).
, "One (1) of the primary purposes of this chapter shall be restoration of the
injured employee to gainful employment." KRS § 342.710(1) (1977).
"' See KRS 342.113, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra note 45,
at 58 (repealed by 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 78, § 36).
7' See KRS § 342.710(3)-(5)(1977).
7' See I.R.C. § 104(a)(1).
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by making it more rewarding to remain disabled than to be
fully rehabilitated.
CONCLUSION
The proper approach to the lost wages dispute is not an
unswerving application of the literal terms of the statute.
Rather, attention to the documented history of the workmen's
compensation statute, to the common law of workmen's com-
pensation that channeled the legislature's language, to the pur-
poses of the workmen's compensation law, and to the structure
of the statute itself should be the aim of judicial craftsmanship.
A decision-making process that is informed by those considera-
tions leads inevitably to the conclusion that "lost wages" as
used by the General Assembly is merely a means of determin-
ing the degree of disability and not the amount of benefits to
which a claimant may be entitled.

